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Abstract. We study a model of collective decision making in which agents vote on the
decision repeatedly until they agree, with the agents receiving no exogenous new informa-
tion between two voting rounds but incurring a delay cost. Although preference con°ict
between the agents makes information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting,
in the equilibrium of the repeated voting game agents are increasingly more willing to vote
their private information after each disagreement. Information is e±ciently aggregated
within a ¯nite number of rounds. As delay becomes less costly, agents are less willing to
vote their private information, and e±cient information aggregation takes longer. Even as
the delay cost converges to zero, agents are strictly better o® in the repeated voting game
than in any single round game for moderate degrees of initial con°ict.
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wishes to thank the Marshall School of Business of the University of Southern California for
hosting his sabbatical when part of the research for this paper is done. We have bene¯ted
from comments by Je® Ely, Roger Gordon, Joel Sobel, and Asher Wolinsky, as well as by
other seminar participants at Florida, Northwestern, Singapore Management University,
UCLA, UCSD, and USC on presentations based on an earlier version of this paper.
{ i {1. Introduction
Individuals may disagree with one another when they have di®erent preferences or when
they have di®erent private information. Often, it is di±cult to distinguish between these
two types of disagreement because divergent preferences provide incentives for individuals
to distort their information. Even though they may share a common interest in some
states had the individuals known each other's private information, the strategic distortion
of information can still cause disagreement in these states. When disagreements lead to
delay in making decisions, it may seem that any decision is better than no decision and
costly delay. We argue in this paper, however, that institutionalized delay in the decision
making process can serve a useful purpose. In the context of a stylized model of repeated
voting, the prospect of costly delay induces the parties to be more forthcoming with their
private information. This enhances information aggregation and potentially improves the
welfare of the agents relative to the case when the decision has to be made immediately
without delay. Even when the delay cost is arbitrarily small, there can be a signi¯cant
welfare gain.
The constructive role of delay in strategic information aggregation is illustrated in the
simplest model that captures the distinction between preference-driven and information-
driven disagreements. Information aggregation is mutually bene¯cial precisely in states of
nature in which agents disagree based on their own private information but would agree if
perfectly informed. This particular con¯guration of preferences and information structures
can be illustrated with the following story. Imagine that two managers of a corporation,
of marketing and R&D divisions, must jointly decide how to enter an emerging market.
One strategy focuses on pushing existing products through a marketing campaign, and the
alternative mainly involves developing a new product that targets the emerging market.
For some types of the market, one strategy is de¯nitely more e®ective than the other, in
which case the two managers both prefer the more e®ective strategy, but there are also
other types of the market for which neither strategy is clearly better, in which case each
manager prefers the strategy of his own division. Suppose that the marketing manager can
distinguish the states for which the R&D strategy is more e®ective from the other states,
and similarly the R&D manager can tell the states for which the marketing strategy is
{ 1 {more e®ective from the other states. With these information structures, the two managers
can disagree on the strategy based on their information only in the states when there is
no clear e®ective strategy. But these are precisely the states where the two would disagree
even if perfectly informed, and thus information aggregation is not an issue. In contrast,
consider a di®erent information structure which for the marketing manager which allows
him to distinguish the states in which the marketing strategy is more e®ective from the
other states, and a symmetric information structure for the R&D manager. Now, it can
happen that the two managers disagree based on their private information but would agree
if perfectly informed. Here, information aggregation is valuable, but it may be precluded
by strategic considerations. This is the environment we are interested in, where delay can
potentially enhance information aggregation and improve welfare.
In many situations collective decisions can only be adopted under mutual consent. If
two parties fail to reach an agreement, the only recourse is to keep trying. We introduce
in this paper a model of repeated voting in which a decision will not be taken until both
sides agree. In each voting round, two individuals vote simultaneously on two alternatives.
If the two votes agree, the agreed alternative is implemented and the game ends; other-
wise, each individual incurs an additive delay cost and voting proceeds to the next round,
until an agreement is reached. There is one con°ict state in which the two individuals
prefer di®erent alternatives, and two equally likely common interest states, one for each
alternative, when their preferences coincide. Ex ante, each individual favors a di®erent
alternative, and the degree of con°ict between the two individuals is captured by the prior
probability of the con°ict state. In each common interest state, the individual who ex ante
favors the mutually preferred alternative is perfectly informed, while the other individual
is uninformed and knows only that the state is not the other common interest state. In
the con°ict state, both individuals are uninformed and each knows only that his ex ante
favorite alternative is not mutually preferred. The information structure and preferences
are such that if the decision must be made without delay, there is no incentive compatible
outcome that Pareto dominates a coin °ip between the two alternatives when the degree
of con°ict is high, even though the state could be a common interest state.
In section 3 we construct a symmetric equilibrium of the repeated voting game. In
equilibrium, the informed type votes his ex ante favorite alternative in every round, while
{ 2 {the uninformed type may randomize between the two alternatives. After each \regular"
disagreement in the previous voting round in which both individuals vote their ex ante
favorite, uninformed types become more convinced that they are facing a common inter-
est state and the other individual is informed, while after a \reverse" disagreement when
they voted each other's favorite alternative, the state is revealed to be the con°ict state.
We show that in equilibrium uninformed types vote their ex ante favorite with a smaller
probability after each regular disagreement. If we think of voting against one's favorite al-
ternative as making concessions in a negotiation process, then the result is that uninformed
types make increasingly large concessions to their opponents. Within a ¯nite number of
rounds, either the mutually preferred alternative is agreed upon, or the negotiation breaks
down because the state is revealed to be the con°ict state.
Section 4 considers welfare properties of the symmetric equilibrium. We show that
the expected payo®s of the informed types and the uninformed types are both decreasing
in the degree of con°ict. In equilibrium information aggregation is perfectly achieved in
the sense that the mutually preferred alternative is chosen whenever the state is a common
interest state, but the price for this achievement is the delay before the decision is made.
We show that the expected length of delay is an increasing function of the initial degree
of con°ict. A decrease in the delay cost causes the uninformed types to be less willing to
make concessions, but increases their equilibrium payo®. Nonetheless, the expected payo®
of the uninformed types is no greater than what they would obtain by an immediate coin
°ip for any delay cost. In contrast, the informed types can do better in the symmetric
equilibrium than an immediate coin °ip if the delay cost is not too large, and if the degree
of con°ict is not too high. When the delay cost converges to zero, the welfare gains for
the informed types converge to strictly positive limits for moderate degrees of con°ict. As
a result, the ex ante equilibrium payo® of each individual in the repeated voting game
is greater than what they would expect from an immediate coin °ip when the degree of
con°ict is moderate. Even though the delay cost between two rounds of voting is arbitrarily
small, the total expected payo® loss from delay is bounded away from zero in equilibrium.
The constructive role played by delay in improving welfare and the quality of information
aggregation is discussed further in section 5.
{ 3 {The problem of disagreement that we study in the repeated voting model resembles
but is not identical to a pure bargaining problem. The two decision makers in our model
have private information about which is the appropriate alternative to adopt. If they could
perfectly aggregate their private information, there are some states of the world in which
they still would disagree because of divergent preferences, but there are also some states
of the world in which they would agree. Therefore the role of delay described in this paper
is di®erent from that in a pure bargaining model (Stahl 1972; Rubinstein 1982). In the
Stahl-Rubinstein bargaining model, the trade o® between getting a bigger share of the
pie but at a later date helps pin down a unique solution to the bargaining problem which
is plagued by multiple equilibria in a one-shot model, even though delay does not occur
in equilibrium. There are numerous extensions to the Stahl-Rubinstein model that can
generate delay as part of the equilibrium outcome. One strand of this literature relies on
asymmetric information about the size of the pie that is being divided.1 In a model of
strikes, for example, a ¯rm knows its own pro¯tability but the ¯rm's unionized workforce
does not. Strike or delay is a signaling device in the sense that the willingness to endure a
longer work stoppage can credibly signal the ¯rm's low pro¯tability and help it to arrive
at a more favorable wage bargain. In this type of signaling models, each agent's gains
from trade at a given price depend only on his own private information. In our model,
disagreement over the alternatives is not a pure bargaining issue, because individuals in
our model would sometimes agree on which is the best alternative had they known the
true state. Put di®erently, voting outcomes in our setup determine the size as well as
the division of the pie. We show that delay can play a constructive role in overcoming
disagreements that arise from strategic considerations and improving the ex ante welfare of
all individuals. Avery and Zemsky (1994) argue that if players are allowed to wait for new
information before accepting or rejecting o®ers, then there is an option value to delay. In
our model, no new exogenous information arrives during the voting process. However, the
1 See, for example, Admanti and Perry (1987), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987), Cho (1990), Cramton
(1992), and Kennan and Wilson (1993). There are also bargaining models that generate equilibrium delay
through commitment to not accepting o®ers poorer than past rejected ones (Freshtman and Seidmann
1993; Li 2007), simultaneous o®ers (Sakovic 1993), multi-lateral negotiations (Cai 2000), and excessive
optimism (Yildiz 2004).
{ 4 {way agents vote provides endogenous information that allow them to update their beliefs
and reach better decisions.
Our paper is also related to the literature on debates (Austen-Smith 1990; Austen-
Smith and Feddersen 2006; Ottaviani and Sorensen 2001) and voting (Li, Rosen and Suen
2001) in committees. Models of debate typically analyze repeated information transmission
as cheap talk, while we emphasize the role of delay cost in multiple rounds of voting.2 Our
setup is the closest to the Li, Rosen and Suen paper. The focus there is on the impossibility
of e±cient information aggregation. Here, we have intentionally skirted issues such as
quality of private signals and the trade-o® between making the two di®erent types of
errors. We focus instead on how costly delay can help improve welfare and the quality of
decisions.
2. The Model
Two players, called Left and Right, have to make a joint choice between two al-
ternatives, l and r. There are three possible states of the world: L, M, and R. The
corresponding prior probabilities are denoted ¼L, ¼M, and ¼R, with ¼L = ¼R = ¼ and
¼M = 1 ¡ 2¼. The relevant payo®s for the two players are summarized in the following
table:
L M R
l (1;1) (1;1 ¡ 2¸) (1 ¡ 2¸;1 ¡ 2¸)
r (1 ¡ 2¸;1 ¡ 2¸) (1 ¡ 2¸;1) (1;1)
In each cell of this table, the ¯rst entry is the payo® to Left and the second is the payo®
to Right. We normalize the payo® from making the preferred decision to 1 and let the
2 Coughlan (2000) investigates conditions under which jurors vote their signals and their information
is e±ciently aggregated in a model where a mistrial leads to a retrial by a new independent jury. He
does not consider the issues of delay that are the focus of the present paper. Farrell (1987) introduces
a model in which repeated cheap talk helps players coordinate to arrive at a correlated equilibrium of a
battle-of-the-sexes game. There is no issue of e±cient information aggregation in that model.
{ 5 {payo® from making the less preferred decision be 1 ¡ 2¸. The parameter ¸ > 0 is the loss
from making the wrong decision. In state L both players prefer l to r, and in state R both
prefer r to l. The two players' preferences are di®erent when the state is M: Left prefers
l while Right prefers r. In this model there are elements of both common interest and
con°ict between these two players. Note that Left ex ante favors l, while Right's ex ante
favorite alternative is r.
The information structure is such that Left is able to distinguish whether the state is
L or not, while Right is able to distinguish whether the state is R or not. Such information
is private and unveri¯able. When Left knows that the state is L, or when Right knows
that the state is R, we say they are \informed;" otherwise, we say they are \uninformed."3
Without information aggregation, the preference between l and r of an uninformed Left
depends on the relative likelihood of state M versus state R. Let ° denote his belief that








If Left could dictate the outcome, he strictly prefers l to r if and only if
° + (1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ 2¸) > °(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ °);
or ° > 1
2. Symmetrically, an uninformed Right strictly prefers r to l if and only if ° > 1
2.
We note that ° can be interpreted as the ex ante degree of con°ict. When ° is high,
an uninformed player perceives that his opponent is likely to have di®erent preferences
regarding the correct decision to be chosen.
There is a potentially in¯nite number of rounds. In each round, Left and Right vote
simultaneously for either l or r. In any round if the votes agree, the agreed alternative
is implemented immediately and the game ends. If the two votes disagree, each player
incurs a delay cost ± > 0 and moves to the next voting round. The cost of delay is
modeled as as an additive ¯xed cost in this paper. Such cost may re°ect the time and
3 It is not essential for our paper that the informed types are perfectly sure that the state is a common-
interest state. The logic of our model remains the same as long as an informed and an uninformed type
favor di®erent alternatives on the basis on their private information only, but would recognize a mutually
preferred alternative when information is shared.
{ 6 {expenses of setting up a second round of meeting and negotiations. An alternative way to
model delay cost is to apply a multiplicative discount factor to the payo®s if the decision
is implemented in the second round. In this case, delaying a preferred decision is more
costly than delaying an inferior decision. Consequently the analysis of the discounting
case is slightly more cumbersome than the ¯xed cost case. We therefore adopt the more
transparent assumption of ¯xed delay cost.4 The basic insights of this paper do not depend
on which of these two assumptions is used.
As a useful welfare benchmark for our repeated voting game, let us consider what
happens if the decision must be made without delay. Imagine a game in which each player
votes l or r simultaneously, with the agreed alternative implemented immediately and any
disagreement leading to an immediate fair coin toss between l and r and a payo® of 1 ¡ ¸
to each player. It is a dominate strategy for an informed player to vote for his ex ante
favorite alternative. For uninformed Left or Right, the optimal strategy depends on the
degree of con°ict, but not on the probability that the other player votes for his ex ante
favorite alternative. Let x 2 [0;1] be the probability that the uninformed Left votes for
l, a measure of how \tough" he is playing. The expected payo® to the uninformed Right
from voting r is
°(x(1 ¡ ¸) + (1 ¡ x)) + (1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¸);
and his expected payo® from voting l is
°(x(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ x)(1 ¡ ¸)) + (1 ¡ °):
It follows that if ° < 1
2, then the dominant strategy for the uninformed players is to vote
against his favorite. In states L and R, such equilibrium voting strategies lead to the mu-
tually preferred alternative being chosen, while in state M, the decision is determined by
°ipping a coin, which is again Pareto e±cient. In contrast, if ° > 1
2, then it is a dominant
strategy for each uninformed player to vote for his ex ante favorite. The equilibrium out-
come is that the two players disagree in every state, and the decision is always determined
by °ipping a coin, with a payo® of 1 ¡ ¸.
4 The elapsed time between successive voting rounds can be quite short relative to the time for the
actual implementation of a decision. In this context, modeling delay as a ¯xed cost may be more realistic
than modeling it as a loss from impatience.
{ 7 {The result that information aggregation is impossible for ° > 1
2 is a robust feature of
the particular con¯guration of information structure and preferences. Indeed, the con¯gu-
ration is intentionally chosen to yield a stronger result that there is no incentive compatible
outcome that Pareto dominates a coin toss when ° > 1
2. To see this, we apply the revela-
tion principle and consider any direct mechanism that satis¯es the incentive compatibility
constraints for truthful reporting of private information. Since in a truth-telling equilib-
rium the true state can be recovered from the reports submitted by the two players, we
can write qR, qM, and qL as the probabilities of implementing alternative r when the true
states are R, M, and L, respectively. Finally, let ~ q be the probability of implementing
r when the reports are inconsistent, that is, when both report that they are informed.
The incentive constraints for, respectively, the informed Right, the informed Left, the
uninformed Right and the uninformed Left, can be written as:
qR + (1 ¡ qR)(1 ¡ 2¸) ¸ qM + (1 ¡ qM)(1 ¡ 2¸);
qL(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ qL) ¸ qM(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ qM);
°(qM + (1 ¡ qM)(1 ¡ 2¸)) + (1 ¡ °)(qL(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ qL))
¸ °(qR + (1 ¡ qR)(1 ¡ 2¸)) + (1 ¡ °)(~ q(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ ~ q));
°(qM(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ qM)) + (1 ¡ °)(qR + (1 ¡ qR)(1 ¡ 2¸))
¸ °(qL(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ qL)) + (1 ¡ °)(~ q + (1 ¡ ~ q)(1 ¡ 2¸)):
The ¯rst two inequalities imply that qR ¸ qM ¸ qL; the last two imply
(1 ¡ °)(~ q ¡ qL) ¸ °(qR ¡ qM);
(1 ¡ °)(qR ¡ ~ q) ¸ °(qM ¡ qL):
Adding the above two inequalities gives
(1 ¡ °)(qR ¡ qL) ¸ °(qR ¡ qL);
which is inconsistent with ° > 1
2 unless qR ¡ qL = 0. Thus, qR = qM = qL when ° > 1
2
in any incentive compatible outcome.5 Since the two players are ex ante symmetric, it is
5 This result does not depend on the symmetry assumption that ¼L = ¼R. No information aggregation
is possible for all ¼L and ¼R as long as both are less than ¼M.
{ 8 {natural to focus on the outcome of qR = qM = qL = 1
2, which is equivalent to a fair coin
toss. Thus, the no-delay payo® of 1 ¡ ¸ is a natural welfare benchmark for comparison
with the repeated voting game when ° > 1
2.
The impossibility of information aggregation when ° > 1
2 assumes there are no trans-
fers. It is easy to see that e±cient information aggregation can be achieved regardless of ° if
a su±ciently large monetary penalty can be imposed on both players when their reports are
inconsistent. In the equilibrium of the repeated voting game analyzed below, costly delay
plays a similar role of incentive budget-breaking. Although the theoretical underpinning
of the constructive role of delay is familiar,6 in many realistic environments of collective
decision making delay is a more natural mechanism than transfers to improve of the qual-
ity of information aggregation. Furthermore, in our model incentive budget-breaking and
welfare improvements occur even in the limit of the delay cost becoming arbitrarily small.
In section 5 we o®er further comments on the budget-breaking mechanism of costly delay
in our model.
3. Equilibrium Construction and Characterization
A non-terminal history in the game of repeated voting consists of the ¯rst moves by nature,
which determine the permanent type of each player, and subsequent disagreeing votes cast
by the two players. An information set for a player of a given type is a collection of
all histories that begin with the same nature's move determining the player's type and
share the same sequence of disagreeing votes. A strategy of a player is a sequence of
randomizations over the two votes for each of his information sets, and a belief system is
a sequence of probability measures over histories for each information set. A sequential
equilibrium is a pro¯le of strategies and a belief system that are sequentially rational
and consistent (Kreps and Wilson 1982). This seems complicated, but note that the
only unobserved component of a terminal history that a®ects the payo® to each player
is the permanent type of his opponent, or equivalently, whether the state is M or not.
We therefore restrict equilibrium strategies of each player such that the vote cast at all
6 A similar logic can be found in Holmstrom's (1982) model of moral hazard in teams, and in Myerson
and Satterthwaite's (1983) model of bilateral trading with asymmetric information.
{ 9 {information sets in a given round of voting depends only on his belief that the state is
M, and simultaneously restrict the belief system to the collection of beliefs of each player
at each information set that the state is M. The notions of sequential rationality and
consistency can be applied in a straightforward fashion to the restricted strategy pro¯les
and belief systems. We refer to the resulting solution concept as \equilibrium." We
look for equilibria such that in each round of voting on and o® the equilibrium path: (i)
the informed types always vote for their ex ante favorite alternatives; (ii) for each pair
of information sets of the uninformed types that share the same sequence of disagreeing
votes, the two types have identical beliefs about the state being M and vote for their ex
ante favorite alternative with the same probability.7 Note that on the equilibrium path,
the notion of consistency in the de¯nition of sequential equilibrium implies that, if the
uninformed types vote for their ex ante favorites with the same probability then they have
the same belief about the state being the con°ict state after any observed sequence of
disagreeing votes.
We will ¯rst construct an equilibrium and then argue that it is unique. For each
belief ° 2 [0;1] that the uninformed types hold regarding the con°ict state M, we denote
as x(°) 2 [0;1] the equilibrium probability that the uninformed types vote for their ex
ante favorite alternative. Let U(°) and V (°) be the equilibrium expected payo®s of the
uninformed and uninformed types respectively.
In each round there are two kinds of disagreement. When Left votes l and Right
votes r, we say that there is a \regular disagreement;" when the opposite occurs, we say
there is a \reverse disagreement." The updating of beliefs of the uninformed types upon
these two kinds of disagreement depends both on the equilibrium strategies and the kind
of disagreement. Given the prior belief ° that the state is M, upon a regular disagreement,
the uninformed types revise their belief weakly downward to
°0 =
°x(°)
°x(°) + 1 ¡ °
· °;
7 In general, there exist equilibria in which the uninformed types adopt di®erent voting strategies, and
when the delay cost ± is large, there exist equilibria in which the informed types vote against their ex ante
favorite alternative. The analysis of these kinds of equilibria is outside the focus of the present paper.
{ 10 {unless ° = 1 and x(°) = 0. Upon a reverse disagreement, the uninformed types are sure
that the state is M, unless x(°) = 1.8
To construct an equilibrium, ¯rst we identify an equilibrium play when the uninformed
players believe that the state is M with probability 1, in which they play mixed strategies
with probability x(1) of voting their favorite alternative. It follows from the indi®erence
condition for the uninformed types between l and r that
U(1) = x(1)(¡± + U(1)) + (1 ¡ x(1)) = x(1)(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ x(1))(¡± + U(1)):
Solving these two equations gives a unique pair of equilibrium values














and U(1) < 1 ¡ 2¸.
Next, we identify an equilibrium play when ° = 0. Since the uninformed Right
believes that the state is L and his opponent (who is informed) votes l, voting l to obtain
the preferred decision is strictly better than voting r. Thus, we have x(0) = 0 and U(0) = 1.
Given this, we claim that it is an equilibrium when ° is positive but su±ciently small that
the uninformed types vote against their ex ante favorite alternative with probability 1. To
see this, note that x(°) = 0 implies that the updated belief upon a regular disagreement
is °0 = 0. Therefore, the payo® to the informed Right from voting r is
° + (1 ¡ °)(¡± + U(0));
and his payo® from voting l is
°(¡± + U(1)) + (1 ¡ °):
Voting l is strictly preferred to voting r if and only if
° <
±
(1 + ± ¡ U(1)) + ±
´ G1: (2)
8 Bayes' rule does not apply after a regular disagreement for ° = 1 if x(1) = 0, or after a reverse
disagreement if x(°) = 1 for some °. In the equilibrium constructed below, the issue of out-of-equilibrium
belief speci¯cation does not arise, because neither x(1) = 0 nor x(°) = 1 for any ° can be an equilibrium.
{ 11 {Therefore, when ° < G1, it is an equilibrium for the uninformed types to \concede" by
voting against their ex ante favorite alternative. The corresponding equilibrium payo® of
the uninformed types takes the linear form of
U(°) = 1 ¡ (1 + ± ¡ U(1))°: (3)
We refer to the interval [0;G1] as the \compromise region."
For ° just above G1, we conjecture that the equilibrium x(°) is such that the one-step
updated belief °0 falls into the compromise region. We may then try to identify some
one-step interval [G1;G2], and so on. This conjecture turns out to be correct. That is,
there exists an in¯nite sequence, G0 < G1 < G2 < :::, with G0 = 0 and limk!1 Gk = 1,
such that if ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1] for k = 1;2;:::, then x(°) 2 (0;1) is such that the updated
belief after a regular disagreement satis¯es
°0 =
°x(°)
°x(°) + 1 ¡ °
2 (Gk¡1;Gk]:
Furthermore, we conjecture that the payo® function for the uninformed types is piecewise
linear of the form
U(°) = ak ¡ bk° (4)
for ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1], with a0 = 1 and b0 = 1 + ± ¡ U(1) from equation (3). Given the
conjectures, we construct the sequences of fGkg and f(ak;bk)g recursively, starting from
G1 and (a0;b0).
Fix any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1] for k ¸ 1. Assuming that the continuation payo® is given by
equation (4), the expected payo® to the uninformed Right from voting r is
(°x+1¡°)(¡±+ak¡1¡bk¡1°0)+°(1¡x) = (°x+1¡°)(¡±+ak¡1)¡°xbk¡1+°(1¡x):
The payo® from voting l is
°[x(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ x)(¡± + U(1))] + (1 ¡ °):
The uninformed Right is indi®erent between r and l when x is given by
x(°) =
°b0 ¡ (1 ¡ °)(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)
°(b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
: (5)
{ 12 {Using Bayes' rule
Gk+1x(Gk+1)
Gk+1x(Gk+1) + 1 ¡ Gk+1
= Gk;
with x(Gk+1) given in equation (5), we can de¯ne Gk+1 as follows:
Gk+1 =
1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + Gk(b0 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + Gk(bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
: (6)
Note that x(°) is increasing in ° from equation (5), implying that the updated belief °0
after a regular disagreement falls in the interval (Gk¡1;Gk]. Finally, substituting equation
(5) into the expression for the payo® from voting r, we can verify that U(°) is indeed
piece-wise linear of the form given in equation (4), where
ak = 1 ¡
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
;
bk = 2¸ +
(b0 ¡ 2¸)(bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
:
(7)
The above is a pair of di®erence equations for the sequence f(ak;bk)g. We have the
following preliminary results regarding the sequences fGkg and f(ak;bk)g. The proof is in
the appendix.
Lemma 1. (i) ak · 1 and bk > 2¸ for all k; (ii) both ak and bk are decreasing in k; (iii)
limk!1 ak exists and is given by a1 = 1 + ¸ ¡
p
±2 + ¸2, and limk!1 bk exists and is
b1 = 2¸; (iv) 0 < Gk < Gk+1 < 1 for all k ¸ 1; and (v) limk!1 Gk = 1.
The above piece-wise construction of x(°) and U(°) ensures that the strategy of the
uninformed types is consistent with equilibrium. It remains to verify that the informed
types have no incentive to deviate by voting against their ex ante favorite alternatives.
This is established below by showing that given the equilibrium strategy of the uninformed
types, the informed types have stronger incentives than the uninformed types to vote for
their ex ante favorite alternative. We can now present the following equilibrium existence
result.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in which the strategy of the uninformed
types is given by x(°) and their payo® is given by U(°).
{ 13 {Proof. First, for ° = 1, since his opponent is choosing l with probability x(1), the
informed Right is indi®erent between voting r and voting l, and his equilibrium payo® is
V (1) = U(1).
Next, for ° 2 [G0;G1], since his opponent is choosing x(°) = 0, the payo® for the
informed Right from voting r is 1, while his payo® from voting l is ¡± + V (1) < 1,
implying V (°) = 1 ¸ U(°), with equality only if ° = 0.
Finally, for ° 2 (G1;1), we ¯rst establish by induction that V (°) > U(°) for all ° < 1,
as follows. Consider any ° 2 [Gk;Gk+1] and k ¸ 1, with °0 = °x(°)=(°x(°) + 1 ¡ °) 2
(Gk¡1;Gk]. We obtain
V (°) > (°x(°) + 1 ¡ °)(¡± + V (°0)) + °(1 ¡ x(°))
> (°x(°) + 1 ¡ °)(¡± + U(°0)) + °(1 ¡ x(°))
= U(°);
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that x(°) < °x(°) + 1 ¡ °, the second
inequality follows from the induction hypothesis, and the last equality follows because the
uninformed Left is indi®erent between l and r for ° 2 [Gk;Gk+1] for k ¸ 1. Moreover,
from the indi®erent condition of the uninformed Left, we obtain
° [x(°)(¡± + U(°0) ¡ 1 + 2¸) + (1 ¡ x(°))(1 + ± ¡ U(1))] + (1 ¡ °)(¡± + U(°0) ¡ 1) = 0:
Note that the last term is strictly negative, and so the expression in the square bracket is
strictly positive. Since V (1) = U(1), and V (°0) > U(°0), this implies that
x(°)(¡± + V (°0) ¡ 1 + 2¸) + (1 ¡ x(°))(1 + ± ¡ V (1)) > 0;
or equivalently,
x(°)(¡± + V (°0)) + 1 ¡ x(°) > x(°)(1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 ¡ x(°))(¡± + V (1)):
The left-hand-side of the above inequality is the equilibrium payo® for the informed Right
from voting r. The right-hand-side is the deviation payo® from voting l, because after a
reverse disagreement the uninformed Left is convinced that the state is M. Thus, the
informed Right strictly prefers r to l.
Q.E.D.
{ 14 {The equilibrium represented by equations (5) and (4) is continuous and monotone with
respect to the degree of con°ict °. Note that the continuity of x(°) in ° is not required for
the construction to be an equilibrium. Nor is it automatic from the construction, because
the equilibrium strategy to the left and inclusive of ° = Gk is constructed in the interval
(Gk¡1;Gk] while x(°) just to the right of Gk is separately constructed in the next step
of [Gk;Gk+1). The continuity and monotonicity of x(°) is indirectly established below by
showing that the payo® function U is continuous.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium strategy x(°) is continuous and increasing for all ° 2
[0;1].
Proof. We ¯rst establish the continuity of U(°) for all ° < 1. For each k ¸ 0, the
function U(°) is trivially continuous at any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1). We show by induction that
U(°) is continuous at each Gk+1, that is,
ak+1 ¡ bk+1Gk+1 = ak ¡ bkGk+1:
For k = 0, we have
a1 ¡ a0 = ¡
±(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + ± + b0 ¡ 2¸
;
and
b1 ¡ b0 = ¡
(b0 + ±)(b0 ¡ 2¸)









Next, denote wk = 1 + ± ¡ ak + bk ¡ 2¸. We have
ak+1 ¡ ak =
b0 ¡ 2¸
wkwk¡1
((ak ¡ ak¡1)(b0 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸) + (1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(bk ¡ bk¡1));
and
bk+1 ¡ bk =
b0 ¡ 2¸
wkwk¡1





1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + Gk(b0 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + Gk(bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
= Gk+1;
{ 15 {where the ¯rst inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second inequality
follows from the law of motion of the sequence fGkg (equation 6). To show that U(°) is
continuous at ° = 1, we note that limk!1 Gk = 1 and a1 ¡ b1 = U(1). The continuity
and monotonicity of x(°) follows immediately.
Q.E.D.
The equilibrium given in Proposition 1 is unique subject to a continuity restriction on
the equilibrium strategy of the uninformed types. In other words, there is no equilibrium
in which the strategy of uninformed types is represented by a continuous function that is
di®erent from x(°).
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium if the strategy of the uninformed types is continuous
in °, then the strategy is given by x(°).
Proof. Suppose that there is a continuous function y(°) de¯ned on °[0;1] such that it
is an equilibrium that the uninformed types with belief ° vote for their ex ante favorite
alternative with probability y(°).
First, in any equilibrium we must have y(1) 2 (0;1), and thus y(1) = x(1) as given by
equation (1). This is because if the uninformed Left votes l with probability 1, then for
the uninformed Right the outcome from voting r would be delay forever, which is strictly
worse than conceding by voting l; and if the uninformed Left votes r with probability 1,
then for the uninformed Right voting r would bring an immediate agreement and strictly
dominate voting l. Thus, in any equilibrium the uninformed types must be indi®erent
between l and r, implying that y(1) = x(1).
Next, we argue that in any equilibrium y(°) = 0 for any ° 2 [0;G1]. This follows
because regardless of the continuation plays, when ° is su±ciently small, the payo® to the
uninformed Right from voting r is strictly lower than the payo® from voting l regardless
of the strategy of the uninformed Left. Further, for ° < G1, if the uninformed Left votes
for l with probability 1, then the uninformed Right strictly prefers l to r, implying that in
any equilibrium y(°) is bounded away from 1. Then, if y(°) > 0 for some ° 2 [0;G1], there
would be some ~ ° 2 (0;°] such that y(~ °) 2 (0;1) and y(~ °0) = 0 where ~ °0 is the updated
{ 16 {belief upon a regular disagreement, which makes it impossible to satisfy the indi®erence
condition for the uninformed types between l and r at ~ °.
Finally, consider any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1] for k ¸ 1. Suppose that we have established the
uniqueness of equilibrium for all beliefs lower than Gk. If y(°) is such that the updated
belief °0 upon a regular disagreement is lower than Gk, then by assumption there is a unique
continuation value U(°0) as given by the proposition. Thus, we must have y(°) = x(°),
because for each °0 · Gk and the corresponding k0 · k ¡ 1, only x(°) simultaneously
satis¯es the equilibrium indi®erence condition of the uninformed types and Bayes' rule.
Suppose there is a subset of (Gk;Gk+1] of a positive measure with the property that for
each ° in this subset y(°) is such that the updated belief °0 is greater than Gk. Since y
is continuous in °, the in¯mum of this subset, ° also has the property that y(°) is such
that the updated belief °0 is greater than or equal to Gk. Clearly, y(°) < 1; otherwise, we
would have U(°) = U(°)¡±, which is impossible. It then follows that Gk · °0 < °, which
contradicts the continuity of y at ° since we have already shown that for any ° 2 [Gk;°)
the equilibrium play is given by x(°) de¯ned in Proposition 1. Thus, for all ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1],
the updated belief °0 after a regular disagreement under the strategy y(°) falls below Gk,
implying y(°) = x(°) and completing the induction argument for the uniqueness of the
equilibrium strategy x(°).
Q.E.D.
The monotonicity result of Proposition 2 provides an intuitive description of the equi-
librium behavior. In each round of voting, there are four possible outcomes: an immediate
agreement on r, an immediate agreement on l, a regular disagreement, or a reverse dis-
agreement. We interpret a reverse disagreement as a breakdown of the negotiation process.
Once a reverse disagreement occurs, it is revealed that what is a good decision for one player
is necessarily an inferior decision for the other player. The continuation game is a version
of war of attrition game, where each uninformed player chooses the stationary strategy
represented by x(1) until they reach a decision.9 Upon a regular disagreement, on the
9 In our version of the war of attrition game, \stopping" corresponds to voting against one's ex ante
favorite alternative. Unlike the standard war of attrition game, when both players vote against their
favorite, we have a reverse disagreement and the game continues.
{ 17 {other hand, the uninformed player becomes more convinced that he is playing against an
informed type. The informed type continues to vote for his favorite alternative, but the
uninformed player will \soften" his position as x(°0) < x(°). In a sense, the negotiation be-
tween the two players is making progress, because the probability of choosing the mutually
preferred alternative rises if the state is L or R. Moreover, for any ° bounded away from
1, it only takes a ¯nite number of rounds of regular disagreement before the uninformed
player yields to his opponent completely by switching to voting against his ex ante favorite
(i.e., x(°) = 0), provided there is no breakdown of negotiation before that. Once the game
reaches this compromise region, there is either an agreement on the mutually preferred
alternative, or the negotiation breaks down and the two uninformed players engage in a
war of attrition by adopting the strategy of voting for his ex ante favorite alternative with
probability x(1).
Although the equilibrium play is monotone in the sense that the uninformed types
make gradually increasing concessions after each regular disagreement, it does not follow
that on the equilibrium path the negotiation process on average speeds up after each
disagreement. That is, the average \hazard rate," de¯ned as the probability that the
negotiation process will end in the next round conditional on it having not ended after
T rounds, is not necessarily increasing in T. Starting from any initial degree of con°ict,
after T rounds of disagreement there are in general three possible scenarios, each with a
di®erent conditional hazard rate: ¯rst, the negotiation process may have already broken
down and the state is revealed to be M, in which case the conditional hazard rate is a
constant given by 2x(1)(1¡x(1)); second, the state is again M, but if T is smaller than the
number of rounds of regular disagreements before the uninformed types concede (i.e., if the
initial degree of con°ict is above GT), then it is possible that all previous disagreements
are regular and the conditional hazard rate is given by 2x(°)(1 ¡ x(°)), where ° is the
belief of the uninformed types after T rounds of regular disagreements; third, the state
is actually L or R, with a conditional hazard rate 1 ¡ x(°). Since x(°) decreases to 0
in a ¯nite number of rounds as ° continues to decrease after each regular disagreement,
after observing a su±ciently long negotiation process, one must rule out the second and
the third scenario and thus expect the average hazard rate to stay the same afterward.
{ 18 {However, observe that x(1) > 1
2 from equation (1), and the conditional hazard rate in the
second scenario may either increase or decrease as ° decreases, depending on whether or
not x(°) is greater than 1
2. Moreover, as the negotiation continues, the probabilities of
these three possible scenarios also vary, changing the relative weights attached to the three
conditional hazard rates. Thus the average hazard rate can have complicated dynamics
before it becomes a constant, even though the conditional hazard rate in the third scenario
is monotonically increasing.
4. Equilibrium Welfare and Comparative Statics
To analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium constructed in section 3, we ¯rst derive
the payo® function of the informed types. Recall that for any belief ° of the uninformed,
V (°) is the equilibrium expected payo® of the informed types. Given the equilibrium
strategy x(°) of the uninformed, V (°) satis¯es the following recursive formula:
V (°) = x(°)(V (°0) ¡ ±) + 1 ¡ x(°); (8)
where °0 = °x(°)=(°x(°) + 1 ¡ °) is the updated belief of the uninformed after a regular
disagreement. Using the characterization of x(°) in Proposition 1, we have the following
result about V .
Lemma 2. There exists a sequence f(ck;dk)g, with ck · 1 decreasing and dk ¸ 0 increasing
for all k, and limk!1 ck = U(1), such that




for any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1], k ¸ 1.
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix, where we establish the following explicit
system of di®erence equations for f(ck;dk)g:
ck = 1 ¡
b0(1 + ± ¡ ck¡1)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
;
dk = dk¡1 +
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(1 + ± ¡ ck¡1)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
:
{ 19 {By the proof of Proposition 2, the payo® function V (°) is continuous for all ° 2 [0;1],
as is U(°). However, while U(°) is decreasing and piece-wise linear in °, and is convex
because bk decreases with k, the payo® function V (°) is piece-wise convex but since dk is
increasing in k, at each kink Gk, the left derivative is smaller than the right derivative.10
Further, from the proof of Proposition 1 we know that the two payo® functions satisfy
V (°) ¸ U(°) for all ° 2 [0;1], with equality only at ° = 0 and ° = 1.11
Given any initial degree of con°ict °, the ex ante equilibrium payo® of each player,








where the equilibrium payo® functions for the uninformed and informed types are weighted
by the prior probabilities of the types. By Proposition 1, U(°) is decreasing in °; by Lemma
2, V (°) is also decreasing in °. Further, from the proof of Proposition 1, V (°) ¸ U(°) for
all °. Since the weight on the informed types' expected payo® in (10) decreases in °, we
have the following result.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium ex ante expected payo® W(°) is a decreasing function
of °.
In either common interest state, L or R, the mutually preferred alternative is always
chosen in equilibrium, while in the con°ict state M there is no mutually preferred alter-
native and in equilibrium l and r are chosen with equal probability. Thus, the payo®s of
uninformed and informed types can be rewritten as the di®erence between the \¯rst best"
expected payo® and the expected loss from delay. More precisely, let I(°) be the expected
payo® loss from delay for the informed, and correspondingly J(°) for the uninformed types.
10 From the proof of Proposition 8 below, we can show that V (°) is concave in the limit as ± goes to 0.
11 While the limit of dk as k goes to in¯nity does not exist, the product dk(1 ¡ °)=° converges to 0
because ° goes to 1 as k grows arbitrarily large, which is why V (1) = U(1).
{ 20 {We have:12
I(°) = 1 ¡ V (°);
J(°) = °(1 ¡ ¸) + (1 ¡ °) ¡ U(°):
(11)








Since V (°) is decreasing in ° by Proposition 3, I(°) is increasing in °. Further, since
bk > 2¸ from Lemma 1, U(°) decreases in ° at a faster rate than the ¯rst best expected
payo® for the uninformed, implying that J(°) is also increasing in °. However, the weights
on the informed and uninformed types change with the degree of con°ict °. Evaluating
the overall e®ect of ° on K(°), we have the following result.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium ex ante expected payo® loss from delay K(°) is an
increasing function of °.
Proof. Fix any ° 2 (Gk;Gk¡1). Using (11) and (12), and taking derivatives of K(°)



















Using equations (4) and (9), we observe that the sign of dK(°)=d° is the same as
2(bk ¡ ¸) +
2(1 ¡ °)
°2 dk + ck ¡ ak:
Since V (°) > U(°) for all ° 2 (0;1) from the proof of Proposition 1, equations (4) and (9)
imply




Since bk > 2¸ by Lemma 1 and dk > 0 by Lemma 2, it is immediate from the above
inequality that the sign of dK(°)=d° is positive.
Q.E.D.
12 The loss functions I and J have explicit expressions using the equilibrium strategy x(°). For
example, for any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1], k = 0;1;:::, the expected loss I(°) for the informed types can be written
as
Pk
k0=0 ±(1 ¡ x(°k¡k0))¦k0¡1
m=0x(°k¡m), where °k = °, and for each k0 = k ¡ 1;:::;1, °k0¡1 is the
updated belief for the uninformed types of °k0 after each regular disagreement. However, it is easier to
characterize the loss functions indirectly through the equations below.
{ 21 {The equilibrium welfare of the informed and uninformed types also critically depend
on the delay cost ±. Before we present the main comparative statics results, we need the
following lemma regarding the e®ects of changes in ± on the coe±cients in U(°) and x(°);
the proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 3. As ± decreases, for any k: (i) (1+±¡ak+bk¡2¸)=b0 decreases; (ii) ak increases;
(iii) bk decreases; (iv) (1+±¡ak)=b0 decreases; and (v) (1+±¡ak)=(b0+1+±¡ak+bk¡2¸)
decreases.
In the following proposition, we establish that as ± decreases, the compromise region
becomes smaller; further, the equilibrium voting by the uninformed types becomes tougher
for any degree of con°ict. Correspondingly, for any initial degree of con°ict, as ± decreases,
it takes a greater number of regular disagreements to reach the compromise region. How-
ever, in spite of the tougher positions taken by the uninformed types, their equilibrium
expected payo®s increase unambiguously because the direct impact of a lower cost of delay
per-round dominates.
Proposition 6. As ± decreases, Gk strictly decreases for each k ¸ 1, U(°) strictly
increases for all ° 2 (0;1], and x(°) strictly increases for all ° 2 (G1;1].
Proof. Fix any k ¸ 1. Let wk = 1+± ¡ak +bk ¡2¸. For the e®ects on Gk, rewrite the












From part (i) and part (iv) of Lemma 3, both wk=b0 and (1 + ± ¡ ak)=b0 are increasing
in ±. It is also clear that Gk+1 is increasing in Gk. Finally, note that G1 = ±=(b0 + ±) is
increasing in ±. An induction argument then establishes that Gk is strictly increasing in ±
for each k ¸ 1.
Next, for the e®ects on U(°), let ~ d > d. Denote the sequence of threshold values of °
corresponding to ~ d as f ~ Gkg, and denote the corresponding sequence of coe±cients of the
payo® function U as f(~ ak;~ bk)g. Suppose that ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1] while ° 2 ( ~ G~ k; ~ G~ k+1]. Then
~ a~ k ¡~ b~ k° < a~ k ¡ b~ k° · ak ¡ bk°;
{ 22 {where the ¯rst inequality follows from part (ii) and part (iii) of Lemma 3, and the second
inequality follows from the convexity of U(°). Thus, U(°) is decreasing in ±.







1 + ± ¡ ak¡1
b0 + wk¡1
:
















by part (vi) of Lemma 3, we obtain xk(°) ¸ xk+1(°) for all ° · Gk+1. Iterating the
argument establishes that xk(°) ¸ x~ k(°) for all ° · Gk+1 and all ~ k ¸ k. The same
argument also proves that xk(°) ¸ x~ k(°) for all ° ¸ Gk and all ~ k · k. Combining these
two results, we have xk(°) ¸ x~ k(°) for all ~ k if ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1]. Now, for any ~ ± > ±, denote
the corresponding equilibrium strategy as ~ x(°), and de¯ne ~ xk(°) analogously. Then, for
any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1],
x(°) = xk(°) ¸ x~ k(°) > ~ x~ k(°) = ~ x(°);
where the ¯rst inequality follows because ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1], and the second inequality comes
from part (i) and part (vi) of Lemma 3. Thus, x(°) is decreasing in ± for all °.
Q.E.D.
For the informed types, the e®ect of a decrease in the delay cost ± turns out to be
generally ambiguous. The uninformed types toughen their positions, which means longer
delays before the mutually preferred alternative is chosen, but each round of disagreement
is less costly.13
We now make the welfare comparison between the equilibrium payo®s of the unin-
formed and informed types with their corresponding benchmarks when there is no pos-
sibility of delay. As discussed in section 2, when the initial degree of con°ict ° is below
1
2, the ¯rst best outcome is achieved in the equilibrium of a voting game in which any
13 Numerical examples of the non-monotonicity of V (°) in ± can be constructed; details are available
upon request.
{ 23 {disagreement leads to an immediate coin toss. The ex ante payo® from such an outcome
is 1 ¡ ¸°. In contrast, if ° > 1
2, no incentive compatible outcome is welfare superior to
the coin toss and the ex ante payo® of 1 ¡ ¸. For the uninformed, it is immediate that
there is no possibility of welfare gain relative to the no-delay benchmark regardless of the
degree of con°ict ° or the delay cost ±. This is because U(°) is a decreasing function, with
a slope bk that is strictly larger than 2¸ by Lemma 1. On the other hand, welfare gains
are possible for the informed types (they are explicitly characterized below for the case of
d going to 0), but not if the degree of con°ict is too large or if the delay cost is too great.
To see why ° cannot be too large, note that V (1) = U(1) < 1 ¡ ¸, so the continuity of
V implies that V (°) is smaller than the benchmark expected payo® of the informed types
for ° close to 1. To see why ± cannot be too great, from equations (2) and (6) we can
verify that for ± su±ciently great, G1 < 1










benchmark payo® of 1 ¡ ¸ if the delay cost ± is su±ciently great.
It is generally di±cult to characterize the welfare gains of the informed types or
the ex ante payo® function W(°). For the rest of this section we focus on the case of
arbitrarily small delay cost ±, which turns out to be nicely behaved and yields clear and
insightful results. From equation (1), we obtain lim±!0 U(1) = 1 ¡ 2¸, implying that
lim±!0 b0 = 2¸. It immediately follows from the di®erence equations (7) for f(ak;bk)g
that lim±!0 ak = 1 and lim±!0 bk = 2¸ for any k. It is then straightforward to show from
(2) that lim±!0 G1 = 0, and from (6) by induction that lim±!0(Gk+1 ¡ Gk) = 0 for any
k ¸ 1. Since limk!1 Gk = 1 for any ± > 0, the number of Gk's in any neighborhood of
a ¯xed ° 2 (0;1) grows arbitrarily large as ± becomes small. Although for any ± > 0, the
payo® functions U and V have a kink at each Gk, we are able to establish that the limits
of U and V are di®erentiable for all ° 2 (0;1), which allows us to characterize the limiting
equilibrium behavior. To do so, we need the following preliminary result; the proof is in
the appendix.
Lemma 4. For any ° 2 (0;1), lim±!0 ±x(°)=(1 ¡ x(°)) = 2¸°.
{ 24 {From (5) we have lim±!0 x(°) = 1 for any ° 2 (0;1).14 Thus, as ± becomes arbitrarily
small, the limit of ±x(°)=(1 ¡ x(°)) has the interpretation of the total expected payo®
loss from delay when the probability of each additional round of delay is x(°). The above
result shows that this payo® loss is a linear function of the degree of con°ict.
Now we are ready to characterize the limits of the payo® functions U and V as ± goes
to 0. Let U0(°) = lim±!0 U(°), and V 0(°) = lim±!0 V (°). These limits are well-de¯ned
because the equilibrium given in Proposition 1 is continuous in ±.
Proposition 7. For each ° 2 (0;1), the limits of the equilibrium payo® functions as ±
going to 0 are given by
U0(°) = 1 ¡ 2¸°;








Proof. First, we show that U0(°) is di®erentiable. Fix any ° 2 (0;1). For any ± > 0,
let x(°) be the equilibrium strategy of the uninformed types, and let °0 be their updated
belief after a reverse disagreement. We have:
U(°) = °[x(°)(¡± + U(°0)) + 1 ¡ x(°)] + (1 ¡ °)(¡± + U(°0)):
Using Bayes' rule, from the above we obtain:
U(°) ¡ U(°0)
° ¡ °0 = ¡
°x(°) + 1 ¡ °
°(1 ¡ °0)(1 ¡ x(°))
d +
1 ¡ U(°0)
1 ¡ °0 :
As ± goes to 0, °0 converges to ° because x(°) goes to 1. Since U0(°) is the limit of
U(°) as ± goes to 0, the left-hand-side in the above equation converges to the derivative
of U0(°). By Lemma 3, the right-hand-side has a limit as ± goes to 0. We therefore have










14 Also, from (1) we have lim±!0 x(1) = 1. Since x(0) = 0 for all ± by construction, x(°) is discontinuous
at ° = 0 in the limit of ± going to 0.
{ 25 {With the initial condition U0(0) = 1, the solution is U0(°) = 1 ¡ 2¸°.
Following a similar argument as above, we can use equation (8) to get the following







1 ¡ V 0(°)
°(1 ¡ °)
:
With the initial condition lim°!0 V 0(°) = 1, we can verify that the solution is as given in
the proposition.
Q.E.D.
With the explicit characterization of the limits of U and V , we can compare them to
the benchmark payo®s when there is no delay. Note that U0 ¡1
2
¢
= 1 ¡ ¸, implying that
the uninformed types get the same benchmark expected payo® in the equilibrium when
° = 1
2. In contrast, V 0 ¡1
2
¢
= 1¡2¸(1¡ln2), which is strictly larger than 1¡¸. Thus, the
ex ante equilibrium payo® to each player is strictly greater than the benchmark no-delay
payo® for an interval of degrees of con°ict above 1
2. By continuity in the delay cost and in
the degree of con°ict, welfare gains over the benchmark case of no delay persist for small
delay costs and for moderate con°ict levels.
We can also analyze the limit behavior of payo® loss from delay. Let I0(°) and
J0(°) be the limit of the expected payo® loss I(°) and J(°) for the informed types and
uninformed types respectively, as ± goes to 0. For any delay cost ±, since U(1) = V (1), from
equation (11) we obtain I(1) > J(1), and therefore by continuity the expected payo® loss
is greater for the informed types than for the uninformed types when the degree of con°ict
is su±ciently great. Intuitively, an informed type knows that even though the state is a
common interest state, his opponent believes the state is actually a con°ict state with very
high probability and thus it will take many rounds of regular disagreement for the latter
to concede. For small degrees of con°ict, however, the opposite comparison between I(°)
and J(°) holds. In particular, so long as ± is strictly positive, we have I(°) = 0 < J(°)
for any ° in the compromise region of (0;G1]. In this case, an informed type expects his
opponent to concede immediately, while an uninformed type believes that the state is the
con°ict state with a positive probability, in which case there will be a reverse disagreement
{ 26 {and delay in the future. Perhaps surprisingly, the following proposition establishes that in
the limit of ± going to 0, the informed types always expect a greater loss from delay than
the uninformed types.
Proposition 8. For all °, the equilibrium expected loss functions satisfy I(°) ¸ J(°)
with equality only at ° = 0.
Proof. From equations (11) and the expression for U0(°), we immediately have J0(°) =
¸°. Similarly, the expected delay loss for the informed type is I0(°) = 2¸(1 + ((1 ¡
°)=°)ln(1¡°)). Using l'Hopital's rule, we get I0(1) = 2¸, which is greater than J0(1) = ¸.
For ° < 1, use the expansion ln(1 ¡ °) = ¡
P1
k=1 °k=k. We can write the di®erence in
delay loss for the two types as











with equality only at ° = 0.
Q.E.D.
As the delay cost ± converges to 0, the compromise region of (0;G1] disappears. More-
over, for any positive °, it now takes arbitrarily long for the uninformed types to concede.
Thus, even though for any positive ±, the informed types get their ¯rst best payo®s with-
out delay in the compromise region and with a short delay when ° is near the compromise
region, in the limit of ± going to 0, the expected payo® loss from delay is greater for the
informed types for ° arbitrarily close to 0. Further, it can be easily veri¯ed from the
expression of I0(°) in the above proof that it is a convex function. When the delay cost ±
is arbitrarily small, the payo® loss from delay for the informed types increases at an ever
faster rate with the degree of con°ict, while the loss increases linearly for the uninformed
types. As a result, the ex ante payo® loss from delay also increases at an increasing rate
with the degree of con°ict. Since the benchmark no-delay payo® is a constant equal to
1 ¡ ¸ for all ° > 1
2, welfare gains from repeated voting with costly delay relative to the
benchmark exist only for moderate degrees of con°ict in the limit of the delay cost going
to 0.
{ 27 {5. Discussion
Our repeated voting game with costly delay is cast in an environment where information
aggregation is impossible in any incentive compatible outcome without delay. In particular,
in the single-round voting game considered in section 2, where the two players vote between
l and r with any agreement carried out immediately and disagreement resolved by a fair
coin toss without delay, the equilibrium outcome is always a coin toss when the degree of
con°ict ° is greater than 1
2. Imagine that this voting game is repeated, as in the present
model, but that there is a hard deadline T, such that if disagreement persists after T rounds
of voting a coin toss is used to decide between the two alternatives without further delay.
In this game, if ° > 1
2, then as the delay cost ± between two rounds of voting converges
to 0, the only equilibrium outcome converges to T ¡ 1 rounds of regular disagreements
followed by a coin toss in the last round.15 Therefore, there are no welfare gains relative
to the single-round voting game in the limit of the delay cost going to 0 so long as there
is a ¯nite deadline. One interpretation of this result is that costless straw polls or other
forms of cheap talk cannot bring about any improvement in information aggregation or
welfare, which is simply another illustration that in the environment of the present model
information aggregation is impossible in any incentive compatible outcome without costly
delay.
Our result of welfare gains for moderate degrees of con°ict in the repeated voting game
with arbitrarily small delay cost hinges on the the assumption that there is no deadline.
Even though in equilibrium the expected duration of disagreement is ¯nite, and in fact it
takes a ¯nite number of rounds of regular disagreement for the uninformed types to concede
completely, the assumption of no deadline in equilibrium creates a strictly positive payo®
loss from delay as the delay cost goes to 0. This payo® loss re°ects the role of incentive
budget-breaking played by costly delay, even as the delay cost goes to 0. It explains the
apparent discontinuity of the possibility of welfare gains relative to the no-delay benchmark
in the length of the deadline at in¯nity.
15 In an earlier version of the paper, we show that for any arbitrarily small but positive ±, there is a T
such that for ° su±ciently close to 1
2 in the repeated voting game, welfare gains relative to the no-delay
benchmark increase with the length of the deadline up to T. This construction requires T to be arbitrarily
large as ± converges to 0.
{ 28 {The budget-breaking role of costly delay is robust to the game form in the repeated
voting game. Imagine a repeated voting game with costly delay which di®ers from our
game only in that each reverse disagreement is followed by an immediate coin toss. Analy-
sis for this game follows in a parallel fashion as what we have done in our paper. Somewhat
surprisingly, in the limit of the delay cost converging to 0, this new game has same equi-
librium outcome as our game. In a sense, the critical part of incentive budget-breaking
has to do with the costly delay that arises after a regular disagreement in which the un-
informed types vote their ex ante favorite alternative in hope of persuading each other to
switch, rather than the costly delay that happens after a reverse disagreement when each
tentatively agrees with the other side.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) For k = 0, we have a0 = 1 and b0 = ± + ¸ +
p
±2 + ¸2 > 2¸. Next, if ak¡1 · 1 and
bk¡1 > 2¸, the two fractions that appear in the di®erence equation (7) are both positive.
Hence ak · 1 and bk > 2¸ by induction.
(ii) For the monotonicity of bk, we can subtract bk¡1 from both sides of the second equation
in (7) to get:
bk ¡ bk¡1 = ¡
1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak + bk ¡ 2¸
(bk¡1 ¡ 2¸) < 0:
To establish the monotonicity of ak, we use induction. First, it is easy to see that
a1 < a0 = 1. Next, assume that ak¡1 < ak¡2. We can write:
ak ¡ ak¡1 =
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡2)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡2 + bk¡2 ¡ 2¸
¡
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
<
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡2)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡2 + bk¡2 ¡ 2¸
¡
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡2 ¡ 2¸
<
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡2)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡2 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
¡
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡2)(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡2 + bk¡2 ¡ 2¸
= 0;
where the ¯rst inequality follows from bk¡1 < bk¡2, and the second inequality follows from
the induction hypothesis and the fact that the second term is decreasing in ak¡1.
{ 29 {(iii) Solving for the steady state version of the di®erence equation (7), we obtain the steady
state values a1 = 1+¸¡
p
±2 + ¸2 and b1 = 2¸. By the monotonicity of ak and bk, these
steady state values are also the limit values of the sequence f(ak;bk)g.
(iv) By de¯nition, we have G1 2 (0;1). Since ak¡1 · 1 and bk¡1 > 2¸, an induction
argument establishes that Gk 2 (0;1) for all k ¸ 1. Next, subtracting Gk from both sides
of (6), we obtain
Gk+1 ¡ Gk =
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(1 ¡ Gk) + (bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)Gk
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + (bk¡1 ¡ 2¸)Gk
> 0:
(v) Since Gk is an increasing and bounded sequence, it has a limit value. By part (iii)
established above, the limit is 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
From the proof of Proposition 1, V (°) = 1 for ° 2 [0;G1]. Let c0 = 1 and d0 = 0. We
derive di®erence equations for ck and dk by induction. For any ° 2 (Gk;Gk+1], k ¸ 1, we
can write
V (°) = x(°)
µ






+ 1 ¡ x(°):
Using the formula (5) for x(°), we can verify the functional form of V and obtain a pair
of di®erence equations in (ck;dk):
ck = 1 ¡
b0(1 + ± ¡ ck¡1)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
;
dk = dk¡1 +
(1 + ± ¡ ak¡1)(1 + ± ¡ ck¡1)
b0 + 1 + ± ¡ ak¡1 + bk¡1 ¡ 2¸
:
It is straightforward to show by induction that ck · 1 and dk ¸ 0 for all k. This implies
that fdkg is an increasing sequence. Let wk = 1+±¡ak+bk¡2¸; that fckg is a decreasing
sequence follows immediately by induction if we establish that wk is decreasing in k. To
prove the latter claim, combine equations (7) to obtain




The derivative of the right-hand-side with respect to wk¡1 is positive. So wk¡1 < wk¡2
implies wk < wk¡1. Now,
w1 ¡ w0 = ± ¡




2b0 + ± ¡ 2¸
< 0:
{ 30 {An induction argument then establishes the claim.
The limit value of ck as k goes to in¯nity is easily veri¯ed by using the limit values of
ak and bk given in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Let vk = 1+±¡ak, wk = vk +bk ¡2¸, and uk = b0+wk. Recall that b0 = 1+±¡U(1),
and therefore db0=d± = 1 + ±=
p
±2 + ¸2. Also, from the proof of Lemma 2 we know that
wk is decreasing in k.




























An induction argument establishes that dwk=d± > 0 if we can show that dw0=d± > 0,
which is true because w0 = ± + b0 ¡ 2¸ is increasing in ±.
To establish part (i) of the lemma, we write fk = wk=(b0 + wk). Use equation (A.1)
for wk to write:
fk =
± + fk¡1(b0 ¡ 2¸)
b0 + ± + fk¡1(b0 ¡ 2¸)
:
The partial derivative @fk=@± has the same sign as




Since wk is decreasing in k, we have that fk is decreasing in k. Therefore, this expression
is greater than




which is positive, where f1 = 1
2 ¡ 1
2¸=(1¡¸+± ¡U(1)) is the limit value of fk as k goes
to in¯nity. It is also easy to see that fk is increasing in fk¡1. The claim then follows if we
{ 31 {show df0=d± > 0, which we can verify by using the de¯nition of f0 and taking derivatives
with respect to ±.
(ii) We claim that (b0 ¡2¸)=uk is increasing in ± for each k. To prove it, let tk = wk +2¸.
Write the di®erence equation for wk in the form:
tk
b0 ¡ 2¸ + tk
=
(± + 2¸)uk¡1 + (b0 ¡ 2¸)(tk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
(b0 + ±)uk¡1 + (b0 ¡ 2¸)(tk¡1 ¡ 2¸)
:
Let gk = (b0 ¡ 2¸)=uk = 1 ¡ tk=uk. Then the above equation can be transformed into:
gk =
b0 ¡ 2¸
± + 2b0 ¡ 2¸ ¡ b0gk¡1
:
It is clear that @gk=@gk¡1 > 0. Moreover, @gk=@± has the same sign as:




Since gk is increasing in k, the above expression is greater than




where g1 = 1
2 ¡ 1
2¸=(1 ¡ ¸ + ± ¡ U(1)) is the limit value of gk as k goes to in¯nity. So an
induction argument will establish the monotonicity of gk with respect to ± if we establish
that dg0=d± > 0, which we can verify by using the de¯nition of g0 and taking derivatives
with respect to ±.
To establish part (ii) of the lemma, we write the di®erence equation for ak as:











Since da0=d± = 0, an induction argument establishes that dak=d± · 0 for each k.
(iii) We write the di®erence equation for bk as:
bk = 2¸ + gk¡1(bk¡1 ¡ 2¸);
{ 32 {implying that
dbk
d±







We have already shown that dgk¡1=d± > 0. Moreover, db0=d± > 0. So an induction
argument shows that dbk=d± > 0 for each k.











Note that v0=b0 = ±=b0 is increasing in ±. Also, gk¡1 is increasing in ±. So an induction
argument establishes the claim.
(v) First, we claim that vk=(b0 ¡ ¸) is increasing in ± for each k. To prove it, write the










Note that v0=(b0¡¸) = ±=(b0¡¸) is increasing in ±. So an induction argument establishes
the claim.
Next, we show that (bk ¡ ¸)=(b0 ¡ ¸) is decreasing in ± for each k. We can write the







(b0 ¡ 2¸)((bk¡1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¸)
(b0 ¡ ¸) + (1 + ± ¡ ak¡1) + (bk¡1 ¡ ¸)
:
De¯ne pk = (bk ¡ ¸)=(b0 ¡ ¸) and qk = (1 + ± ¡ ak)=(b0 ¡ ¸). Then we can write



























































Since db0=d± > 0, dgk¡1=d± > 0, dqk¡1=d± > 0 and dp0=d± = 0, an induction argument
establishes that dpk=d± < 0 for each k.
To establish the last part of the lemma, we divide both the denominator and numerator





1 + qk + pk
:
Since qk is increasing in ± and pk is decreasing in ±, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 4
Fix any ° 2 (0;1). For each ± > 0, let k(±) be such that ° 2 (Gk(±);Gk(±)+1]. Note that as




°b0 ¡ (1 ¡ °)(1 + ± ¡ ak(±)¡1)
1 + ± ¡ ak(±)¡1 + °(bk(±)¡1 ¡ 2¸)
:
Since k(±) goes to in¯nity as the delay cost ± converges to 0, and since a1 = 1, we have





















It is straightforward to verify that lim±!0(1 ¡ a1)=± = 0. Since a0 = 1, we have the











Using the di®erence equations (7), and a0 = 1 and b0 = 1 + ± ¡ U(1), we can easily verify
that lim±!0(b1 ¡ 2¸)=± = 0. Since b1 = 2¸, we immediately obtain the desired result for
the second limit.
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